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Executive Summary

n recent years, the aging of the population and the
increasing preference for “aging in place” have
combined to generate explosive growth in demand
for home care workers. In New York State, the
number of home health aide and personal care aide
jobs is projected to rise from 440,000 in 2018 to
over 700,000 by 2028, driven by employment in
home care agencies, private households, and public
programs like the Medicaid Consumer Directed
Personal Assistance Program (CDPAP). High turnover adds to the problem: employers across the state
need to recruit an average of 26,510 new aides each
year simply to keep up with the growing demand for
care, as well as an additional 71,680 workers each
year to replace the thousands of aides who leave
these occupations or exit the labor force entirely.
In total, over the ten-year period 2018-2028, nearly
1,000,000 job positions must be filled to meet the
demand for aides.
The demand for home care workers — aides who
work in private homes — already exceeds the supply.
A 2018–2019 statewide survey
of home care agencies found
that, on average, 17 percent of
home care positions were left
unfilled due to staff shortages.
Because home care work is
typically poorly paid, as well
as physically and emotionally
stressful, it is difficult to recruit
new workers and retain existing
ones. The COVID-19 pandemic
has increased demand for
home care even more, while
further depressing the labor
supply. In a Fall 2020 survey,
85 percent of participating New
York State home care agencies reported worsening staff

shortages. As a result of these staff shortages, many
individuals with unmet home care needs experience
hospitalizations that might otherwise be unnecessary,
and many enter nursing homes, a costly alternative to
in-home care that became especially dangerous during
the COVID-19 pandemic.
This report explores one potential solution to
the home care labor shortage: substantially raising
wages for New York State’s home care workers. The
analysis presents detailed projections, based on the
best available data, of the economic effects of such an
intervention, estimating the costs and benefits that
would result. We find that public funding for wage
increases and health insurance coverage for the
State’s home care workers would require significant
resources, but those costs would be more than offset
by the resulting savings, tax revenues, and economic
spillover effects.
The analysis in the report specifies the costs and
benefits of two different wage increases, tailoring each
to the State’s three existing minimum wage zones:
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• “Target 1” would raise home care wages to
$40,000 annually ($22.00 hourly) in New York
City, $35,000 ($19.25 hourly) on Long Island and in
Westchester County, and $30,000 ($16.50 hourly)
in the rest of the state.
• “Target 2” would raise wages further: to $50,000
annually ($27.50 hourly) in New York City, $45,000
($24.75 hourly) on Long Island and in Westchester
County, and $40,000 ($22.00 hourly) in the rest of
the state.
Either of these wage levels would represent a large
increase in compensation for New York State home
care workers, whose current median annual earnings
is only $22,000. Approximately 191,000 workers, or 86
percent, would receive a raise at Target 1 levels. Nearly
207,000, or 93 percent, would receive a raise at Target
2 levels. Economic impact estimates for each target
wage level also incorporate the additional cost of
providing health insurance to home care workers who
lack coverage, as well as increased payroll taxes.

Public investment in improving the
compensation of home care workers would
yield net economic benefits.
• Target 1 wage increases, health coverage, and
payroll taxes would total approximately $4 billion
per year, and for Target 2 about $6.3 billion.
• But the combined value of new savings, tax revenues, and economic spillover effects resulting from
improved compensation would far exceed these
costs. The estimated total on the economic benefit
side of the ledger is $7.6 billion for Target 1 wage
increases and $12.9 billion for Target 2 increases.
• These savings would be distributed across local,
state, and federal levels, with a net gain of $3.7
billion for Target 1 and $6.6 billion for Target 2.
The analysis includes estimates of three types of
costs: wage increases, extension of health insurance
to workers who would lose their current Medicaid

2

coverage, and new payroll costs associated with wage
increases, such as larger employer FICA contributions
and higher premiums for disability and workers’
compensation insurance. It also estimates the
economic benefits of increasing wages, which include
new income and sales tax revenues, savings from
reduced turnover, productivity gains, and economic
spillover effects from workers spending their increased
earnings. The results are summarized below.
Economic gains would be distributed across local,
state, and federal levels in part because workers’
increased spending would not be confined to New
York State. Acknowledging this measurement challenge, we estimate economic benefits for New York
State overall would approximate $5.4 billion for Target
1 and $9 billion for Target 2, with net gains dependent
on how wage increases would be funded.
In short, it is in the State’s interest to invest
in large-scale pay increases and health insurance
coverage for home care workers. Such increases
should be tailored to regional variations in the cost
of living and designed to ensure that no workers
experience benefits cliffs or net decreases in income.
It is also critical to ensure that funding is appropriated
not only for wage increases but also for the accompanying payroll costs, such as insurance premiums
for disability benefits and workers’ compensation.
Another caveat is that at higher wage levels, many
workers who currently receive Medicaid would lose
that coverage; it is crucial that the State cover the cost
of providing them with health insurance, so that the
benefits of higher wages will not be negated.

Improving compensation for home care
workers would help to alleviate the existing
shortages in the occupation, and also spur
employment growth in other fields.
• Higher wages would attract more workers to the
home care field and would cause some home care
aides who currently work part-time to seek more
hours. The result would be an increase of nearly
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20,000 full-time equivalent home care workers for
Target 1, and over 38,000 workers for Target 2.
• The economic multiplier effects that would result
from the wage improvements for home care
workers would also create nearly 18,000 jobs in
other industries for Target 1, and nearly 30,000
new jobs for Target 2. This is because home care
workers would spend their additional earnings on
goods and services, including housing, food, transportation and other basic necessities, stimulating
job creation in a range of occupations.
• The estimated effects on employment are summarized below. These are one-year effects; their

year-to-year continuity would depend on a number
of factors, including the relationship between
wages in home care and those in other fields.
Overall, the report’s analysis shows that allocating
state funding to raise home care wages to the
proposed target levels would generate net benefits, as
the cost of doing so is greatly exceeded by the savings
that would result. Raising pay would also help to meet
the skyrocketing demand for home care workers and
stimulate additional employment growth in other
sectors. These findings align with previous research
demonstrating the positive economic impacts of wage
increases and of public investment in care work.

Costs and Economic Benefits of Home Care Wage Increases (per annum)
Costs
Wage Costs
Healthcare Costs
Payroll Tax Costs
Total Costs
Economic Benefits
Economic Spillover
New Income Tax Revenue
New Sales Tax Revenue
Public Assistance Savings
Turnover Reduction
Productivity Gains
Total Economic Benefits
Net Economic Gain

Target 1 Wage Increase

Target 2 Wage Increase

$2,873,200,000

$4,875,890,000

$856,436,000

$982,186,000

$235,378,000

$397,102,000

$3,965,014,000

$6,255,178,000

$4,597,121,000

$7,801,425,000

$1,097,914,000

$1,974,244,000

$141,591,000

$240,284,000

$495,637,000

$645,336,000

$151,327,000

$252,211,000

$1,149,280,000

$1,950,356,000

$7,632,870,000

$12,863,856,000

$3,667,856,000

$6,608,678,000

Employment Effects of Home Care Wage Increases
New Home Care Workers
New Jobs, Other Industries
Total Employment Gains

Target 1 Wage Increase

Target 2 Wage Increase

19,440

38,370

17,600

29,870

37,040

68,240
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Introduction

etween 2021 and 2040, New York State’s
overall population is projected to grow a
modest 3 percent, but the number of adults
65 and over will increase by over 25 percent,
and the number of adults 85 and over by nearly 75
percent.1 The aging of the population will, in turn,
dramatically increase the need for long-term care
among older residents of the State. Indeed, employment in direct care occupations is rapidly expanding,
and will continue to do so at a steadily accelerating
rate. Across home- and institution-based settings,
the number of home health aide and personal care
aide jobs is projected to rise from 440,000 in 2018
to over 700,000 by 2028, making these the two
largest occupations in the State. The magnitude of
this growth, driven primarily by demand for in-home
care, is staggering: home health and personal
care aides alone will add as many jobs to the state
economy as will the next forty largest occupations
combined.2
New York’s ability to fill these jobs — and retain
workers in them — will determine whether older adults
will receive the care they need in the coming decades.
Every year, employers across the state need to recruit
an average of 26,510 new aides simply to keep up with
the demand for care. Yet, given high turnover in these
disproportionately low-wage jobs, employers also
must recruit an additional 71,680 workers each year to
replace the thousands of aides who leave these direct
care occupations or exit the labor force entirely. As a
result, over the 2018-2028 decade, a projected total
of nearly 1,000,000 openings for home health aides
and personal care aides will need to be filled statewide — 265,100 due to rising demand and another
716,800 to replace workers who exit.3
At current levels of recruitment and retention, the
State is already unable to keep pace, especially for
home care workers — defined here as home health
aides and personal care aides who provide assistance
to older adults and people with disabilities in their

own homes (as opposed to in nursing homes or other
group care facilities). A 2018–2019 statewide survey of
home care agencies found that, on average, 17 percent
of home care positions were left unfilled due to staff
shortages. As a result, nearly 15 percent of patients
experienced delays in accessing care, and 24 percent
were unable to access services at all.4 Findings from a
labor market analysis of home health aides (excluding
personal care aides) suggest that the State could face
a cumulative shortage of approximately 230,000 aides
over the next decade — hindering efforts to fill the
nearly 1 million projected openings.5
This crisis has been looming for years. Since the
1970s, the expansion of home- and community-based
care as an alternative to institutional care, along
with the growing preference for aging in place, has
spurred rising demand for home care workers. By
the mid-1980s, signs of a lasting labor shortage were
evident across New York State. “Health Aides in Short
Supply,” a 1987 New York Times headline warned.
In the accompanying story, a Nassau County health
official explained, “Until we can offer the aides a sense
of worth, a sense of recognition, a fair salary, fringe
benefits and some sort of career type mobility, we’re
going to have a problem getting sufficient aides and
retaining them.”6
However, such warnings have gone unheeded.
More than three decades later, despite a range of
policy and advocacy efforts, home care worker recruitment and retention remain hampered by inadequate
wages, benefits, and career ladders.7 With the aging
of the baby boomer generation and the attendant
rise in care needs, the problem has grown into a
full-blown crisis, one further exacerbated by the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Available data suggest that the pandemic has
increased demand for home care while depressing the
labor supply, widening the gap between care needs
and care provision. A survey of 77 New York State
home care agencies in Fall 2020 found that 65 percent
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experienced an increase in home care referrals during
the pandemic, both from hospital discharges and from
families and individuals seeking to avoid the risks of
nursing homes. Yet 85 percent of agencies reported
worsening staff shortages, as the pandemic-related
dangers of face-to-face direct care work added to the
already existing challenges of recruitment and retention. As a result, 76 percent of the agencies surveyed
were forced to delay acceptance of new referrals or
deny them entirely in 2020.8
Against that backdrop, this report explores the
potential impact of seeking to alleviate the labor
shortage by substantially raising wages for New York
State’s home care workers — whether employed
through home care agencies, private households, or
public programs like Medicaid Consumer Directed
Personal Assistance. Our analysis, based on the best
available data, offers specific projections of how such
an intervention would affect the State economically,
and systematically estimates the costs and benefits
involved. We are not advancing a specific policy
proposal but rather analyzing the likely effects of largescale improvements in home care compensation.
We find that public funding for wage increases and
health insurance coverage would require substantial
resources, but that those costs would be more than
offset by the potential savings, tax revenues, and
economic spillover effects that would result from
raising home care workers’ pay.

6

This report examines two different wage increases,
tailoring each to the State’s three existing minimum
wage zones. What we call “Target 1” would raise home
care wages to $40,000 annually ($22.00 hourly) in
New York City, $35,000 ($19.25 hourly) on Long Island
and in Westchester County, and $30,000 ($16.50
hourly) in the rest of the State. “Target 2” would raise
wages even further: to $50,000 annually ($27.50
hourly) in New York City, $45,000 ($24.75 hourly)
on Long Island and in Westchester County, and
$40,000 ($22.00 hourly) in the rest of the State. We
also examine the cost of providing health insurance
coverage along with the wage increases.
Target 1 wage increases and associated costs would
total approximately $4.0 billion, and Target 2 increases
would add up to $6.3 billion. Based on our projections, however, the combined value of new savings,
tax revenues, and economic spillover effects resulting
from those wage gains would far exceed these costs,
totaling $7.6 billion for Target Wage 1 and $12.9 billion
for Target Wage 2 raises. The economic benefits and
savings would be distributed across state, federal, and
local government, with a net gain of $3.7 billion for
Target 1 and $6.6 billion for Target 2.9
In addition to generating new savings and
revenues, higher wages would reduce turnover and
attract new workers into the direct care field, dampening the labor shortage and thus expanding access to
home care. We estimate that over 19,000 new home
care workers would enter the occupation per year at
Target 1, and 38,000 at Target 2 wages. The economic
spillover of home care raises would also create jobs in
other industries: 17,600 jobs per year at Target 1 and
29,900 jobs at Target 2 wages.
These findings align with previous research
demonstrating the positive economic impacts of
wage increases and of public investment in care work.
In particular, we build on a 2020 nationwide study
by LeadingAge and the University of Massachusetts
Boston, which analyzed the effects of paying a living
wage to direct care workers and similarly found net
economic gains.10 Our findings are also in accord
with research on public investment in care sectors
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more broadly, which reveal large effects on economic
activity and on job creation both within and beyond
care industries.11 Previous research has even found
that public investment in the care sector would
generate more job growth (for both women and men)
than would similar investment in the construction
sector, pointing to a promising strategy for a “care-led
recovery” from the COVID-19 recession.12
A core premise of this report is that any large-scale
transformation of wage and benefit levels in the home
care sector will require new public funding. Blanket
minimum wage increases, such as those New York
has implemented since 2015, are problematic in this
sector, because by themselves they fail to alleviate
the burden on the agencies and households that
employ care workers and who ultimately must pay
the higher wage costs. Home care agencies in New
York State largely depend on public funding, so when
the minimum wage rises but funding does not — as
has been the case since 2018 — agencies confront
enormous difficulties in maintaining, much less
expanding, their operations.13 Wage increases are also
unsustainable for many of the private households who
pay for home care directly. In the absence of any state
or federal long-term care insurance program, home
care often imposes tremendous costs — an average
of nearly $60,000 annually in New York State.14 If
the minimum wage rises without a corresponding

increase in public subsidies, prohibitive costs can
lead households to turn to unpaid family members
or to workers paid “off the books” at subminimum
wages — both of which are already common
strategies.15
Although this report focuses on future costs
and benefits of wage increases, our analysis also
highlights the many financial and social costs already
imposed by the home care labor crisis. With over
700,000 workers expected to leave home care by
2028, employers face immense turnover costs as they
recruit, hire, and train replacements. Individuals with
unmet home care needs are likely to experience hospitalizations that might otherwise be unnecessary, and
many will enter nursing homes, where care is far more
expensive than that provided by aides in recipients’
own homes. Unmet needs for home care may also
render state governments vulnerable to legal liabilities:
in an ongoing federal lawsuit, a group of Michigan
plaintiffs argue that curtailed access to Medicaid
home- and community-based services violates their
right to non-institutional care options.16 Finally, as
noted above, the gap in paid care work is often filled
by unpaid family members, mostly women, who limit
or halt their participation in the labor force to care for
loved ones, reducing overall economic activity and
widening gender inequalities.17
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Overview of Projected Effects
e estimate three types of costs:
wage increases, extension of health
insurance to workers who would lose
Medicaid coverage, and new payroll

costs associated with wage increases, such as larger
employer FICA contributions and higher premiums
for disability insurance. We then present projections
of the resulting economic benefits, from new income
tax revenue to reduced turnover and statewide
economic growth. Table 1 summarizes each of these

projected effects, which result in a net gain of $3.7
billion for Target 1 and $6.6 billion for Target 2.
As we discuss below, the economic gains would be
distributed across the local, state, and federal level, in
part because workers’ increased spending would not
be confined to New York State. Acknowledging the
measurement challenge this presents, we estimate
that the economic benefits for New York State would
approximate $5.4 billion for Target 1 and $9 billion
for Target 2, with net gains dependent on how wage
increases would be funded.

Table 1. Annual Costs, Economic Benefits, and Employment Effects of Home Care Wage Increases
Costs
Wage Costs
Healthcare Costs
Payroll Tax Costs
Total Costs
Economic Benefits
Economic Spillover
New Income Tax Revenue
New Sales Tax Revenue
Public Assistance Savings
Turnover Reduction
Productivity Gains
Total Economic Benefits
Net Economic Gain
Employment Effects
New Home Care Workers
(Full-Time Equivalent)
New Jobs, Other Industries
Total Employment Gains

8

Target 1

Target 2

$2,873,200,000

$4,875,890,000

$856,436,000

$982,186,000

$235,378,000

$397,102,000

$3,965,014,000

$6,255,178,000

$4,597,121,000

$7,801,425,000

$1,097,914,000

$1,974,244,000

$141,591,000

$240,284,000

$495,637,000

$645,336,000

$151,327,000

$252,211,000

$1,149,280,000

$1,950,356,000

$7,632,870,000

$12,863,856,000

$3,667,856,000

$6,608,678,000

19,440

38,370

17,600

29,870

37,040

68,240
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Cost of Higher Wages
NUMBER OF WORKERS

T

o estimate the size of the current home care
workforce we used American Community
Survey (ACS) data for “home health aides”
and “personal care aides” who work in noninstitutional settings.18 The estimated total number
of home care workers in the State and in each
geographical zone within it are shown in Table 2. In
total, approximately 223,530 home care workers were
employed in New York State in 2019.

CURRENT WAGES
To estimate the cost of raising wages, we begin by
calculating the current wages of home care workers in
the State and in each geographical zone. To do that,
we drew on self-reported personal annual earned
income data from the 2019 ACS, first transforming
it from annual to hourly earnings and then adjusting
from 2019 to 2020 levels.19 Table 3 provides the
resulting estimated median and mean wage for home
care workers, statewide and for each zone.20

COST OF INCREASING WAGES
TO TARGET 1 AND TARGET 2
Next, we consider two target wage rates for each zone,
identified by the New York State Office for the Aging
(NYSOFA) for the purposes of this study. These rates
are shown below in Table 4. To convert the annual
targets to hourly wages, we assumed a full-time workload of 35 hours per week and 52 weeks per year, which
is consistent with the current median workload of
New York State home care workers. To put these target
wage rates in context, we provide the hourly living
wage rate for an individual worker in a two adult/two
child family, and the hourly rates proposed for home
care workers in the Fair Pay for Home Care Act.
Either of the target wage levels would represent a
large increase in compensation for New York State
home care workers, whose current median annual
earnings is only $22,000. Approximately 191,000
workers, or 86 percent, would receive a raise at
Target 1 levels. Nearly 207,000, or 93 percent, would
receive a raise at Target 2 levels.

Table 2. Estimated Number of Home Care Workers by Place of Work, 2019
Geographical Zone

New York City (5 boroughs)
Long Island and Westchester
Rest of State
New York State

Home Care Workers

Percentage

162,080

72.5%

24,680

11.0%

36,770

16.5%

223,530

100.0%

Table 3. Current Estimated Home Care Wages, New York State, 2020
Zone

New York City (5 boroughs)
Long Island and Westchester
Rest of State
New York State

Median Hourly Wage21

Mean Hourly Wage

$14.08

$15.93

$14.42

$16.41

$12.76

$16.58

$13.80

$16.09
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Table 4. Target Home Care Wage Rates, New York State, 2020
Our Study
Zone

Comparisons

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

Living Wage for a
2 Adult/2 Child Family22

Fair Pay for Home
Care Act23

$22.00
($40,000)

$27.50
($50,000)

$26.48

$22.50

$19.25
($35,000)

$24.75
($45,000)

$26.77

$22.50

$16.50
($30,000)

$22.00
($40,000)

$22.70

$22.50

New York City
(5 boroughs)
Long Island and
Westchester
Rest of State

To estimate the cost of increasing home care
workers’ wages, for each geographical zone we
calculated the difference between the target wage rate
(shown in Table 4) and the current hourly wage of
each worker in the ACS sample. We then calculated
the annual cost for each worker at 35 hours per week
for 52 weeks per year, which is the current median
workload for New York State home care workers. The
total cost per zone is shown in Table 5.

COST OF FRINGE BENEFITS
In addition to the cost of increasing wages, we estimated the cost of providing home care workers with
health insurance coverage, as well as the cost of the
additional payroll taxes that employers would incur if
wages were raised.

Health Insurance
We estimated the cost of extending health coverage
to all home care workers who would otherwise lack
coverage at higher wage levels. According to the ACS

data, about 92 percent of New York State’s home care
workers currently have some type of health insurance
coverage. The first group requiring coverage once
wages were raised is the 8 percent who currently report
having none. The second group is the approximately
45 percent whose current health insurance is from
Medicaid. Approximately 35 percent of workers in this
group would no longer be eligible for Medicaid once
their wages were raised to Target 1 levels, and this
figure rises to 41 percent at Target 2 levels.24
In developing our estimates, we assumed that the
State would fully subsidize the cost of workers or
employers purchasing health insurance. To estimate
that cost, we consulted several sources to develop
regionally sensitive estimates of health care packages
for different family types.25 Combining this data with
the ACS, we estimated the annual cost of providing
health insurance for workers lacking coverage at Target
1 and Target 2 wage levels. The estimates assume that
workers with any children under 26 years old would
receive a family plan, while single workers and married
workers without children would receive an individual

Table 5. Estimated Annual Cost of Home Care Wage Increases, New York State
Zone

New York City (5 boroughs)
Long Island & Westchester
Rest of State
Total
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At 35 Hours Weekly for All Workers
Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

$2,372,838,000

$3,856,988,000

$227,853,000

$449,043,000

$272,510,000

$569,859,000

$2,873,200,000

$4,875,890,000
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plan. The results are shown in Tables 6a and 6b. As
we discuss below in presenting our savings estimates,
the bulk of this cost would represent a shift in State
spending rather than new spending, as the vast
majority of these workers are currently covered by
Medicaid.26

Additional Benefits
In addition to health insurance, the State could choose
to provide additional benefits to home care workers,
such as a retirement plan. Based on data from a home
care program in Wayne County, NY, we expect that a
retirement plan would cost approximately 10 percent
of total wages — a large cost, but one that previous

research has shown to be highly effective in reducing
worker turnover.27 Similarly, the State or employers
could choose to cover other payroll taxes normally
paid by workers, like the New York State Paid Family
Leave program deduction. Covering that deduction,
which costs home care workers between $100 and
$200 annually, would require $6.8 million at Target 1
wage levels and $12.4 million at Target 2 levels.
The State might also decide to raise wages for
some workers above the Target levels, in order to
preserve wage scales within the occupation. This
would be a way to maintain a wage differential for
workers with greater seniority, for example. This is
known as ripple wage effects, or a wage contour. We
discuss this possible cost at the end of the report.

Table 6a. Cost of Providing Health Insurance to New York State Home Care Workers, Target 1 Wage Increases

Zone

New York City
(5 boroughs)
Long Island and
Westchester
Rest of State
Total
a

Cost to Cover
Uninsured
Workers, Mix of
Individual and
Family Plansa

Number of
Workers Losing
Medicaid
Eligibility

Cost to Cover
Workers Losing
Medicaid, Mix of
Individual and
Family Plans

Total Cost to
Provide Health
Insurance

12,370

n/a

29,480

$567,836,000

n/a

1,590

n/a

1,390

$26,499,000

n/a

3,240

n/a

4,300

$43,052,000

n/a

35,170

$637,387,000

Number of
Uninsured
Workers

17,200

$219,049,000

$856,436,000

Estimates are not available by individual zone due to insufficient sample sizes.

Table 6b. Cost of Providing Health Insurance to New York State Home Care Workers, Target 2 Wage Increases

Zone

New York City
(5 boroughs)
Long Island and
Westchester
Rest of State
Total
a

Cost to Cover
Uninsured
Workers, Mix of
Individual and
Family Plansa

Number of
Workers Losing
Medicaid
Eligibility

Cost to Cover
Workers Losing
Medicaid, Mix of
Individual and
Family Plans

Total Cost to
Provide Health
Insurance

12,370

n/a

32,670

$642,198,000

n/a

1,590

n/a

1,560

$30,469,000

n/a

3,240

n/a

7,140

$90,470,000

n/a

41,370

$763,137,000

Number of
Uninsured
Workers

17,200

$219,049,000

$982,186,000

Estimates are not available by individual zone due to insufficient sample sizes.
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Our core estimates do not include the costs of
these additional fringe benefits and ripple wage
effects, but they should be considered in the
development of any future policy to improve home
care compensation.

PAYROLL TAXES AND EXPENSES
Under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA),
employers are required to pay a specified share of
both social security and Medicare payroll taxes.
Taken together, the employer share is 7.65 percent of
gross pay. Using this rate, we calculated the cost of
the additional payroll taxes that would be required if
wages were increased to the two target levels. These
estimated costs are shown in Table 7 below.
Higher wages would result in additional changes
to employer payroll expenses. These changes are
modest in comparison to the cost of wages and health
insurance, but they are not insignificant. In some
counties, employers would be responsible for paying
the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Mobility
Tax, also known as the MTA tax. Most home care
agencies would face an MTA tax rate of 0.34 percent
of quarterly payroll expenses. To calculate changes in
workers’ compensation premium costs, we assumed,

based on industry averages, that such costs comprise
0.1 percent of annual payroll. Disability insurance
is more complex, as premium rates only apply to
worker incomes up to $17,680 annually. Thus raises
for workers already above that wage level would not
affect disability benefits insurance costs; only raises
for workers below that wage level would result in
cost increases. We calculated that aggregate change
in income for the latter group of workers up to the
$17,680 cap, assuming an average disability insurance
premium cost of 0.3 percent of annual payroll.28
Federal unemployment tax applies only to the
first $7,000, and state unemployment tax only to the
first $11,800, of a worker’s income. Thus raising an
employee’s annual pay from, for instance, $22,000 to
$30,000 would not affect their employer’s unemployment tax costs.

TOTAL COSTS
Table 8 shows the estimated total cost of raising
wages to Target 1 and 2 wage levels, paying additional
employer payroll taxes and insurance premiums, and
providing health insurance to workers who would lack
coverage at the two target wage levels.

Table 7. Change in Employer Payroll Taxes and Premium Costs
FICA Taxes
MTA Tax
Disability Insurance
Workers’ Compensation Insurance
Total

Target 1

Target 2

$219,800,000

$373,006,000

$11,452,000

$17,968,000

$1,253,000

$1,253,000

$2,873,000

$4,876,000

$235,378,000

$397,102,000

Table 8. Total Annual Cost of Home Care Wage Increases
Target 1

Wage Cost (all workers at 35 hours)
Health Insurance Cost, Mix of Plans
Employer Payroll Tax and Premium Increases
Total
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Target 2

$2,873,200,000

$4,875,890,000

$856,436,000

$982,186,000

$235,378,000

$397,102,000

$3,965,014,000

$6,255,178,000
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Savings and Benefits
of Higher Wages
NEW INCOME TAX REVENUES

H

igher wages would generate new income
tax revenue at the local, state, and federal
level. To estimate the magnitude of that
revenue, we calculated the median income
tax liabilities for home care workers after the target
wage increases. We determined tax liabilities based
on household type: single without children; single
with children; married without children; and married
with children. We also accounted for common
deductions, exemptions, and credits. Table 9 presents the estimated total revenue increases accruing
to each level of government.29
One component of these income tax changes
is the federal, state, and local Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). Table 10 shows the estimated total
EITC savings that would accrue to each tax authority.
These savings are included in the broader income
tax changes presented above, but we disaggregate
them here to illustrate their role in revenue gains and

reduced spending, as EITCs are refundable under
certain conditions.
In addition to generating new income tax revenue,
the proposed wage increases would result in increased
employee FICA contributions: $273 million at Target 1
wages and $444 million at Target 2 wages.

SAVINGS FROM REDUCED
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE SPENDING
Currently, at least 54 percent of New York State home
care workers are covered by Medicaid or receive food
or cash assistance through various public programs.30
Fewer home care workers would be eligible for such
public assistance programs if their wages rose. Using
available data, we estimate the resulting savings for
Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), and the School Lunch Program,
shown in Table 11.
The largest savings would stem from reduced
Medicaid enrollment, which would be split between

Table 9. Estimated Annual Increase in Income Tax Revenue
Tax Authority

New York City
New York State
Federal government
Total

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

$124,398,000

$202,295,000

$286,386,000

$518,211,000

$687,130,000

$1,253,737,000

$1,097,914,000

$1,974,244,000

Table 10. Estimated Annual Savings from Earned Income Credit Reductions
Tax Authority

New York City
New York State
Federal government
Total

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

$3,680,000

$5,904,000

$22,160,000

$36,893,000

$73,867,000

$122,975,000

$99,707,000

$165,771,000
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Table 11. Estimated Savings from Reduced Public Assistance Spending, by Program
Program

Medicaid
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
School Lunch Program
Total
federal and state governments. Combined with other
programs, these savings offset much of the cost of
extending health insurance shown in Tables 6a and 6b
above. Moreover, this is a conservative estimate, as
additional savings would result from reduced reliance
on programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF); Women, Infants, and Children nutrition program (WIC); housing subsidies; and home
energy subsidies. Due to data constraints, however, it
is not possible to project the savings associated with
these programs with any precision. See Appendix A for
further methodological details.

Benefits Cliffs
Under certain conditions, a worker losing public
assistance benefits due to higher wages may, in
fact, experience a drop in total income — an effect
known as a “benefits cliff.” We conducted additional
analysis to assess whether Target 1 and Target 2 wage
increases might unintentionally produce such effects.
Policy analysts have noted that the exact outcome for
each worker is difficult to determine, as their annual
income, taxes, and benefits depend on many factors,
including hourly wage, hours worked, number of
dependents, ability to apply for and access benefits,
and more.31 With this challenge in mind, we calculated
the impact of raising wages for a hypothetical worker
most likely to rely on public assistance programs as an
income supplement: a single adult with two children
under age 12. We estimate the effects for this hypothetical worker in each geographical zone, calculating
the change in their disposable income after Target 1
and Target 2 wage increases.32
14

After Target Wage 1
Increases

After Target Wage 2
Increases

$410,440,000

$518,995,000

$77,356,000

$106,707,000

$7,841,000

$19,633,000

$495,637,000

$645,336,000

With higher wages, workers will pay more in
taxes and some may lose benefits. We estimated the
net impact on their disposable income, detailed in
Appendix B. The results show that if the State raises
wages and provides health care for those who lose
Medicaid, workers in each zone, at each level of raise,
will experience a significant net increase in disposable
income, even accounting for higher taxes and losses
in public benefits. However, in New York City, a single
worker with two young children would likely experience
larger net income gains with the Target 1 raise than
with the Target 2 raise. In the other zones, however,
such workers would experience the greatest increase
in disposable income with the higher Target 2 raise.
We also analyzed a scenario in which the State does
not provide health insurance, and workers who lose
Medicaid eligibility purchase it on their own. Here
we assumed that the single worker with two children
would buy an individual plan for themselves through
the New York State of Health Marketplace (Bronze
Plan) and a subsidized plan through Child Health Plus
for their children.33 For each zone and target wage
level, such a worker would experience a net increase,
with one exception: at the Target 1 raise, a single
worker with two children in Long Island/Westchester
would experience a small drop in disposable income
due to the benefits cliff (see Appendix B for details). In
this case, the higher raise would not be large enough
to compensate for the high cost of health insurance
for a worker and two children, and overall disposable
income would drop by 1.2 percent — an example
that underscores the crucial role of health insurance
coverage in boosting worker incomes.
Finally, we examined net income changes for single
workers with no children, who are ineligible for many
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public benefits. With a wage increase, they would pay
more in taxes, but their increase in disposable income
would rise in all zones at the Target 1 level, and rise
even more at the Target 2 level, even if they must pay
for their own health insurance after the raise.34

SAVINGS FROM
REDUCED TURNOVER
The home care field suffers from high turnover rates
due to low wages and poor benefits. Additional challenges include workplace hazards and inadequate
training that can lead to injuries.35 Long-term care
workers also experience severe job stress and high
rates of absenteeism and burnout.36 A 2008 study
found that 40 to 60 percent of new home health aides
leave the job after less than one year. Another 80 to
90 percent leave the field within the first two years.37
Turnover has significant costs. As previous research
has shown, it is associated with lower quality of care,
reduced access to care, and increased demand for and
strain on more expensive nursing homes.38 Turnover
also generates substantial “separation costs” for
employers, such as the expenses involved in recruiting
and hiring, training, orientation, and termination. A
2004 report reviewed eight studies of turnover costs
for care workers and found estimates ranging from
$951 to $5,276 per employee, with an average of $2,712
per employee.39 Adjusted for inflation, this is $3,799
in 2020 dollars — almost 16 percent of the median
home care worker income in New York State. Boushey
and Glynn conducted a review of 30 case studies and
found turnover costs averaged 20 percent of wages
for workers earning less than $50,000 per year, and
16 percent for those earning less than $30,000.40
However, this review was not limited to the home
care industry, and the home care studies it referenced
found below-average turnover costs.
Based on this literature, our estimates assumed
turnover costs of 16 percent of median home care
worker annual earnings in New York State, or $3,526
per separation. With a wage increase, turnover would
be less costly in some respects: for example, a higher

wage could attract a larger and more qualified supply
of workers, reducing recruitment and training costs.
However, other turnover costs, such as processing
terminations, could increase. In view of these complex
and potentially conflicting effects, we assumed that
the total turnover cost per worker would not change
as the wage level increases.
Precise turnover rates for New York State home
care workers in 2020 are not available. For this study
we assumed that annual turnover is 64 percent, the
most recent national estimate from the 2019 Home
Care Benchmarking Survey.41
Most studies find that when wages rise, turnover
falls. In one of the most comprehensive studies of
wage and benefit increases for home care workers,
Candace Howes studied the impact of a living wage
policy in San Francisco on worker retention.42 She
found that a $1 wage increase reduced turnover by
17 percentage points; and that adding health and
dental benefits reduced turnover by 21 percentage
points each. Overall, a living wage policy that almost
doubled wages over four years and added health
benefits reduced turnover by 57 percent for new home
care workers and by 31 percent for all home care
workers. In later research, Howes found that turnover
reduction resulted only when “good health care” was
offered, and not with health insurance plans with
restrictive eligibility requirements.43
Studies in other states have found similar results.
For example, when Illinois increased its hourly
reimbursement rate for Medicaid-funded home care
services by 47 percent over five years, turnover fell
by over 50 percent. In Wyoming, a 46 percent wage
increase reduced turnover by 38 percent.44 However,
Howes’s is the only study that includes estimates
of health care provision on turnover rates. Applying
Howes’s findings to New York State, we found
that turnover would fall by an estimated 31 percent
for home care workers. Rounding this down to 30
percent, we projected savings from reduced turnover
of approximately $151 million per year, as shown in
Table 12.
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For the Target 1 wage increase, we included a
second scenario, in which turnover falls only 20
percent. Indeed, a slack labor market and continued
high unemployment could reduce turnover, dampening the effect of wage increases. Also, the provision
of health care benefits may have less of an impact due
to the Affordable Care Act, which had not yet been
passed when Howes conducted her study. In this
second scenario, estimated turnover savings are about
$101 million per year.
For the Target 2 raise, we again assumed a 30
percent reduction in turnover. We added a second
scenario in which turnover falls by 50 percent, based
on the turnover reduction that occurred when Illinois
raised home care wages, mentioned above. This
increases the estimated savings from turnover to
approximately $252 million, as shown in Table 12.

SAVINGS FROM INCREASED
PRODUCTIVITY
Previous research on wage increases for low-wage
workers consistently finds that such changes are

associated with higher productivity. Current workers
may become more motivated, healthier, and more
efficient in their job tasks when they are paid more. In
addition, new recruits, attracted by higher wages relative to other occupations, may be better educated and
more highly skilled, and thus more productive.45 We
would expect to see similar changes in the home care
field. A broad conception of productivity also suggests
that higher home care wages may lead to better health
outcomes for clients, reducing hospitalizations and
other costly interventions.46 It is important to note,
however, that productivity gains in the context of home
care do not necessarily reflect a reduction in the quality
or quantity of services provided to care recipients.
Productivity impacts, however, are difficult to quantify due to data limitations. Given that constraint, we
drew from past studies to estimate potential productivity increases for two scenarios: a high-end estimate,
in which productivity gains equal 100 percent of wage
increases; and a low-end estimate, with productivity
gains at 40 percent of wage increases, shown in
Table 13.47

Table 12. Estimated Savings from Reduced Turnover, at Two Target Wage Levels
Savings from Reduced Turnover

Wages Raised to Target 1 Levels
Scenario 1: Turnover Falls 30%, from 64% to 45%
Scenario 2: Turnover Falls 20%, from 64% to 51%

$151,327,000

Wages Raised to Target 2 Levels
Scenario 1: Turnover Falls 30%, from 64% to 45%
Scenario 2: Turnover Falls 50%, from 64% to 32%

$151,327,000

$100,884,000

$252,211,000

Table 13. Estimated Productivity Gains from Higher Wages
Scenario 1: Productivity Gains Equal 100% of Wage Increase
Scenario 2: Productivity Gains Equal 40% of Wage Increase
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Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

$2,873,200,000

$4,875,890,000

$1,149,280,000

$1,950,356,000
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ECONOMIC SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Any money that the State invests in additional home
care wages will have spillover effects, as workers will
spend those additional wages on goods and services,
or to pay off debts. Low-wage workers tend to spend
a higher share of their wages compared to those
earning high wages, who might instead put money
into savings.48 The money spent by home care workers
whose wages increase thus could stimulate new
economic activity, creating new jobs in other industries.
A recent review of such fiscal multipliers concluded
that, “Stimulus policies with a high bang for the buck
deliver resources quickly, and to the households most
likely to need help making ends meet and so will
quickly spend rather than save any additional dollar
they receive.”49 This suggests that wage increases to
low-wage workers would have a substantially greater
impact than alternative policies like tax cuts.
There are a variety of methodologies for calculating
spillover effects, and previous studies find a relatively
large range.50 Here, we use a standard fiscal multiplier
approach which assumes that a given outlay of public
spending will result in additional economic output of
a specific magnitude. We employed two multipliers
used by Weller et al. (2020): a multiplier of 1.8 and
one of 1.6.51 We also calculated the effect of a lower

multiplier of 1.4, based on other studies of minimum
wage increases in a city or state.52 Table 14 shows the
resulting estimates, which are based on the assumption that raises would be applied to 2020 home care
wages and the 2020 home care workforce size. As we
note below, the scale of the actual economic impacts
could be different in future years, depending on
changes in baseline wages and workforce size.

NEW SALES TAX REVENUES
Increased spending would generate new sales tax
revenues. A large share of spending, however, would
not be taxable, including most food purchases and
debt payments. Using 2018 tax and spending data for
New York State, we found that sales tax revenues equal
3.08% of total personal consumption expenditures.53
We applied this percentage to the projected consumer
spending levels in order to estimate new sales tax
revenues, shown in Table 15.

TOTAL SAVINGS, REVENUES,
AND SPILLOVER
Table 16 summarizes the overall economic benefits
of raising home care worker wages in New York State.
Their total estimated value is $7.6 billion for Target
Wage 1 and $12.9 billion for Target Wage 2. Based on

Table 14. Estimated Additional Economic Output Resulting from Higher Wages
Scenario 1: Multiplier of 1.8
Scenario 2: Multiplier of 1.6
Scenario 3: Multiplier of 1.4

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

$5,171,761,000

$8,776,603,000

$4,597,121,000

$7,801,425,000

$4,022,480,000

$6,826,247,000

Table 15. Estimated Sales Tax Revenue Resulting from Increased Economic Output
Scenario 1: Multiplier of 1.8
Scenario 2: Multiplier of 1.6
Scenario 3: Multiplier of 1.4

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

$159,290,000

$270,319,000

$141,591,000

$240,284,000

$123,892,000

$210,248,000
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Table 16. Total Savings, Revenues, and Economic Spillover Effects
Source

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

Income Tax Revenue Increase, New York State
Income Tax Revenue Increase, New York City and Federal
Sales Tax Revenue Increase
Public Assistance Reduction
Turnover Reduction
Productivity Gains
Economic Spillover
Total

$286,386,000

$518,211,000

$811,528,000

$1,456,033,000

$141,591,000

$240,284,000

$495,637,000

$645,336,000

$151,327,000

$252,211,000

$1,149,280,000

$1,950,356,000

$4,597,121,000

$7,801,425,000

$7,632,870,000

$12,863,856,000

these projections, the economic benefits would more
than offset the cost of raising wages and extending
health insurance plans to those without coverage as
detailed above ($4.0 billion for Target Wage 1 raises
and $6.3 billion for Target Wage 2 raises).
Table 16 shows the estimated effects of a 30
percent turnover reduction for Target 1, and of a 50
percent reduction for Target 2. For productivity gains,
we selected the more conservative estimate (40
percent of wage gains), and for economic spillover,
our estimate is based on the moderate assumption
discussed above, namely a multiplier of 1.6. The sales
tax estimates are based on the same assumption (a
multiplier of 1.6).
It is difficult to isolate the share of economic
benefits that would accrue to New York State alone,
as some economic spillover will extend beyond the
state’s borders. Low-income workers spend a disproportionate share of their wages locally — on housing,
childcare, gas, local grocers and restaurants, and the
like. But other expenses, including debt payments
and online retail, often leave the state. As discussed
above, we used a moderate economic multiplier
to account for such out-of-state “leakage,” yet that
multiplier cannot precisely capture the extent to which
increased economic activity would benefit New York
State specifically. Acknowledging these limitations, we
present a tentative estimate of savings and gains that
would directly benefit the New York State government
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and private sector, one that includes new income and
sales tax revenue, reduced state share of Medicaid
spending, and economic spillover. We project that the
economic benefits for New York State overall would
approximate $5.4 billion for Target 1 and $9 billion
for Target 2, with net gains dependent on how wage
increases would be funded.

EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
As we noted in the Introduction to this report,
labor supply in this industry continues to lag even
as demand rises, resulting in a serious shortage of
home care workers. The result is that many home
care jobs are left unfilled, and staff shortages in turn
force home care agencies to turn down prospective
clients and cause state programs to accrue waiting
lists. While greater investment would create new positions and more hiring capacity, recruiting workers for
existing positions remains a formidable challenge for
the industry.
It is reasonable to assume that if the State could
help raise wages to a living wage, more people
would enter the field. Here we build on the work of
McClelland and Mok (2012), as well as Weller et al.
(2020).54 As McClelland and Mok detail, existing
research on labor supply dynamics suggests that
higher wages will attract workers from other occupations or from outside the existing labor force. The
additional provision of health insurance would likely
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attract even more new workers to the field. Drawing
from McClelland and Mok and Weller et al., we
assumed that for each 1 percent gap between the
average wage for low-wage workers and our Target
wage levels, care work employment would increase by
0.1 percent.55 Adding health insurance coverage would
lift this increase to 0.2 percent. In other words, as
home care compensation increases relative to other
low-wage occupations, a certain number of workers
will shift to home care work from other occupations.
The results range from a low of 8,390 to 33,090 new
home care workers entering the occupation annually,
as shown in Table 17.
Higher wages could also spur changes in hours
worked among certain groups already employed in
the field. Here we focus on home care workers who
report in the Current Population Survey that they work
part-time for non-economic reasons, which means
they may have the ability to adjust their hours if wages
were raised. Within this group, however, some workers
would likely keep their weekly hours constant. Others
might decrease their hours, once they are able to

garner the same total income for fewer hours. Still
others might increase their hours, incentivized to earn
more by higher wages — including those workers who
may have formerly limited their hours to maintain
eligibility for public assistance. To estimate the net
effect on hours, we again follow McClelland and Mok
(2012) and Weller et al. (2020), and assume that for
every 1 percent gap between current wages and Target
wages, workers would increase their hours of work by
0.1 percent, and increase their hours by 0.2 percent
if provided with the wage increase plus health insurance. Table 18 shows the results, with a net increase
in aggregate hours yielding new full-time equivalents
ranging from 1,340 to 5,280.
In addition to increases in the home care labor
supply from a wage increase and provision of health
care, the new economic activity generated will also
create new jobs in other fields. As noted earlier, home
care workers will spend the bulk of their additional
earnings on goods and services, including housing
costs, food, transportation and basic necessities. This

Table 17. Increase in Home Care Workers Due to Wage Increases and Health Care, by Region
Total Increase in Employment Due to:
Zone

New York City (5 boroughs)
Long Island and Westchester
Rest of State
Total

Raise to
Target Wage 1

Target Wage 1
plus Health

Raise to
Target Wage 2

Target Wage 2
plus Health

6,960

13,910

12,740

25,490

700

1,390

1,600

3,200

730

1,460

2,200

4,400

8,390

16,760

16,540

33,090

Table 18. Increase in Hours and Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) Due to Wage Increases and Health Care, by Region
Total Increase in Full-Time Equivalents Due to:
Zone

New York City (5 boroughs)
Long Island and Westchester
Rest of State
Total

Raise to
Target Wage 1

Target Wage 1
plus Health

Raise to
Target Wage 2

Target Wage 2
plus Health

1,110

2,220

2,030

4,070

110

220

260

510

120

230

350

700

1,340

2,670

2,640

5,280
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in turn will spur job creation in a range of industries
and occupations.
Based on the multipliers above, we estimated the
extent of new economic activity that would be generated by the Target 1 and 2 home care wage increases.
We then estimated the number of jobs that would be
created due to this increased activity, in sectors such
as grocery stores, gas stations and clothing stores.
Here we assumed that growth in the state gross
domestic product will generate new jobs in various
sectors based on home care workers’ increased
consumption of goods and services.56 The results
range from 15,400 to 33,610 new jobs, as shown in
Table 19.
Although we can estimate overall induced
employment, it is beyond the scope of this analysis
to examine how higher wages would affect specific
industries related to home care. The impact on
nursing home employment would be especially
relevant for future analysis, as higher wages in home
care might draw some workers away from nursing
homes. However, such a relationship need not be
zero-sum. The state of Connecticut, for instance,
has implemented policies to “rebalance” Medicaid
long-term supports and services, gradually shifting
care provision from nursing facilities to home- and
community-based care. As part of this initiative,
Connecticut crafted strategies to facilitate worker
transitions from jobs in nursing homes to those in
community-based care.57 These strategies recognize
that recruiting nursing home workers for home care
jobs makes sense given the similar skill sets required.
Doing so as part of a coordinated policy effort may
both advance Medicaid rebalancing and mitigate the
broader home care labor shortage.

WAITING LIST REDUCTION
AND PREVENTABLE
INSTITUTIONAL CARE COSTS
The shortage of home care workers across New York
State leaves many individuals without the services they
are authorized to receive. Some of them join waiting
lists for services, as in the case of programs administered by the New York State Office for the Aging, such
as Expanded In-home Services for the Elderly (EISEP),
as well as other federal, state, and locally funded
initiatives that support the Aging Network’s in-home
program. As of February 2021, over 10,000 individuals
statewide were on waiting lists for these NYSOFAadministered programs, including 2,950 individuals
awaiting personal care services.58 Even more may be
on waiting lists for certain Medicaid-funded programs,
but those data are not available.
NYSOFA-administered programs would need to
recruit between 700 and 1,000 new home workers in
order to meet the needs of the individuals on waiting
lists, as personal care aides in these programs assist
an average of three to four clients. We estimated
above that, statewide and across programs, between
8,300 and 33,000 new workers would enter the
home care field annually if wages and benefits were
increased. If even a small portion of these workers
were recruited into NYSOFA-administered programs,
waiting lists for those programs could be significantly
reduced, if not eliminated.
Clearing such waiting lists would spur additional
savings, as individuals with unmet home care needs
may become hospitalized, turn to nursing home care,
or develop more complex needs that ultimately require
costlier Medicaid home care services. To estimate

Table 19. Estimated Indirect Job Growth Resulting from Higher Wages
Scenario 1: Multiplier of 1.8
Scenario 2: Multiplier of 1.6
Scenario 3: Multiplier of 1.4

2 0

Target Wage 1

Target Wage 2

19,800

33,610

17,600

29,870

15,400

26,140

The Case for Public Investment in Higher Pay for New York State Home Care Workers

©Tommy Larey/Shutterstock.com

these preventable costs, we used data collected by the
Association on Aging in New York on the outcomes of
waitlisted individuals. Based on past outreach to over
1,900 individuals awaiting services in eight counties,
the Association determined that 10 percent of them
had been admitted to nursing homes, while 6 percent
had received Medicaid home-based or communitybased care. Assuming similar outcome patterns
statewide, the State could preempt nursing home and
Medicaid usage for approximately 470 of the current
2,950 waitlisted individuals by ensuring access to
home care.59
Table 20 illustrates the estimated savings that
would accrue if those waitlisted individuals were to
receive NYSOFA-administered home care services in
lieu of nursing home and Medicaid services.60 These
estimated savings, based solely on documented
waiting lists for NYSOFA-administered programs,
likely represent only a fraction of total preventable
nursing home, hospitalization, and Medicaid LTSS
costs. Many individuals who need home care do not
join waiting lists, so their outcomes and associated

costs are unknown. Given these limitations, we do
not include an estimate of preventable nursing home
and Medicaid usage in our total economic impact
projections. As a result, we most likely underestimate
the potential savings that would result from improved
compensation for home care workers.

Table 20. Preventable Costs from Clearing Waiting Lists for NYSOFA-Administered Personal Care Services, 2021

Statewide

Preventable Nursing
Home Cost

Preventable
Medicaid Cost

Total Preventable
Cost, Excluding
Hospitalizations

State Share of
Preventable Cost

$43,844,000

$8,806,000

$52,650,000

$26,325,000
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Additional Considerations
RIPPLE EFFECT WAGE
INCREASES

I

f the wages of the lowest-paid workers are raised,
workers who were previously earning just above
the new floor wage may also expect or demand
a raise. Or, in order to preserve an existing wage
ladder (or “wage contour”) employers might raise
the wages of workers out of a sense of fairness or
to reward factors such as seniority. Such raises are
known as “ripple effect” wage increases.
Previous research suggests that ripple effects
are usually found in cases of mandated minimum
wage increases, although the scope and scale of the
resulting raises vary, in part depending on the size of
the wage bump and the nature of the labor market.
One study found that the 1997 federal minimum wage
increase led to smaller raises up to approximately the
15th wage decile, resulting in more workers receiving
ripple effect raises than those who received mandated
raises due to the minimum wage bump. Specifically,
4 million workers got raises totaling $741 million due
to the increase in the mandated minimum wage, while

another 11.5 million workers higher up the wage ladder
received ripple effect raises of $1.28 billion.61
Other research has examined the wage bumps
that occur with living wage ordinances. These studies
also find ripple effect increases, but the total impact
is smaller than those associated with hikes in the
minimum wage. For example, studies of living wage
laws in California found that ripple effect raises added
between 13 and 35 percent to the total cost of the
mandated wage increase.62
In this study, Target 1 wage levels represent a
significant jump over current home care earnings and
cover a substantial number of workers in the occupation. For example, raising wages to the Target 1 level
would benefit 89 percent of all home care workers in
New York City, 84 percent of those in Westchester/
Long Island, and 73 percent in the rest of the state.
At Target 2, 94 percent of New York City home care
workers would benefit, along with 93 percent in
Westchester/Long Island, and 88 percent in the rest of
the state.
Ripple effect wage increases are optional, in the
sense that the employer may or may not include them,
and if they do occur, employers can structure the

Table 21. Example of Ripple Effect Wage Increases Compared to No Ripple Effect,
Target 1 Wage Increase for New York City
Before Raise
Wage Percentile

Up to 50th percentile
50th
60th
70th
80th
90th
100th

2 2

Median wage
within each percentile63

New Wage After Raise to Target 1
(New York City)
With no ripple effect

With ripple effect

$10.33

$22.00

$22.00

$13.38

$22.00

$22.00

$14.78

$22.00

$22.62

$15.45

$22.00

$23.03

$17.00

$22.00

$24.14

$19.71

$22.00

$25.63

$29.57

$29.57

$31.05
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contour of raises in a variety of ways. To take account
of potential ripple effect raises, Table 21 models an
example in which such increases start at the 60th
percentile wage group for the Target 1 raises in New
York City.
Table 22 summarizes the total cost of ripple effect
increases for this hypothetical wage contour, which is
the difference between the cost of the targeted wage
increases themselves and the higher wages necessary
to maintain the wage contour.

PHASED-IN WAGE INCREASES
Our estimates above assume that wage increases
and enhanced benefits would be implemented all at
once. In practice, wages are often raised in phases,
sometimes over as long a period as four or five years.
Increasing home care wages to the Target 1 or Target 2
level could be phased in as well.
If this were the case, the cost of the wage bump
would be lower in each year, but the savings would be
lower as well. A smaller initial wage increase would
leave more workers receiving public assistance, and
it would have a smaller impact on turnover and
productivity. With a smaller increase, fewer workers
would be incentivized to increase their hours of work
or to enter the field. However, we would expect to see
the reductions in costs and savings to be proportional
to the estimates provided above.

On December 31, 2020, minimum wages in Long
Island/Westchester increased from $13.00 to $14.00
per hour, and from $11.80 to $12.50 in upstate New
York. The estimates in this report are based on 2020
data and do not account for this raise. For home care
workers who receive these raises, the total cost of
increasing their wage to the Target 1 or Target 2 levels
will be reduced.
Another factor to be considered in regard to
phasing in the increases is that some of the projected
costs and savings would occur each year, but others
would decrease over time. For example, most
estimates suggest that the savings from turnover and
productivity gains would phase out over time.
Even if compensation improvements were implemented all at once, the costs and economic benefits
estimated in this report would change as the home
care workforce further expands. Raising wages, as
intended, could attract more workers into the field,
mitigating the State’s mounting home care labor
shortage. If that occurs, the cost of providing the
wage and benefit levels in question would grow still
further. Yet such workforce expansion would augment
the savings and benefits outlined above: a larger,
better paid workforce would yield greater tax revenues,
economic spillover effects, and savings from reduced
hospitalization and nursing home usage.

Table 22. Total Cost of Ripple Effect Wage Increases by Region
Region

New York City
Long Island/Westchester
Rest of State
Total

Target 1 Raises

Target 2 Raises

$262,251,000

$420,055,000

$44,853,000

$47,357,000

$25,275,000

$26,859,000

$332,379,000

$494,272,000
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Recommendations
and Conclusions

o tackle the mounting labor shortage in the
home care sector, the State must consider
bold strategies to transform wages and
work conditions, attract new workers to the
field, and retain existing ones. Our analysis shows
how one such strategy, a major increase in home
care compensation, would not only alleviate the
labor shortage but also create significant economic
benefits for the State. The total cost would be
approximately $2.9 billion per year to raise wages
to Target 1 levels, and $4.9 billion to raise them to
Target 2. Adding health insurance coverage and additional payroll expenses would increase the total cost
to $4 billion and $6.3 billion, respectively — representing 1.3 percent and 2 percent of total New York
State health care spending.64
Although these costs are substantial in relation to
current spending on long term care, we have shown
that the potential savings are far larger. Indeed, an
investment in raising home care worker wages in
the short-term would result in vast savings in the
medium- and long-term: total economic benefits of
$7.6 billion for Target 1 wage increases and $12.9
billion for Target 2 increases, yielding a net gain of
$3.7 billion for Target 1 and $6.6 billion for Target
2. Furthermore, these findings may, in fact, underestimate the economic benefits of wage increases
because data constraints impede analysis of several
public assistance programs as well as preventable
health expenditures such as hospitalizations and
nursing home admission.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
• Our analysis shows that allocating funding to raise
home care wages to the target levels proposed
would create net economic benefits, since the cost
of doing so is greatly exceeded by the savings that
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would result. The proposed Fair Pay for Home
Care legislation offers one immediate opportunity
to create large-scale pay increases similar to
those analyzed in this report. In developing such
policies, target wage levels should be tailored to
regional variations in the cost of living, and should
be designed to ensure that no workers experience
benefits cliffs or net decreases in income.
• It is critical to ensure that funding be appropriated
not only for wage increases but also for the associated payroll costs, such as insurance premiums for
disability benefits and workers’ compensation.
• Funding healthcare coverage for workers who
would lose Medicaid eligibility is also strongly
recommended. At higher wage levels, many
workers who currently receive Medicaid would
lose their coverage. If those workers must then
purchase their own insurance, the benefits of
higher wages could be negated.
• Both the State and private employers should
consider funding additional employee benefits in
order to attract new workers and reduce turnover.
Retirement plans, and defined benefit pension
plans in particular, would have strongly positive
effects on worker recruitment and retention.65
This report does not address the details of policy
design or the policy mechanisms that implementation of the above recommendations would require.
Collaboration between the State and diverse stakeholders would be necessary to navigate the complexity
of the home care sector and to craft effective policy
solutions. Medicaid would likely play a central role
because employment through its programs currently
undergirds such a large share of the home care workforce.66 This report is intended to inform future policy
efforts by determining how large-scale improvements
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to home care compensation would affect New York
State economically.
Our findings are not surprising; they are consistent
with previous research on the positive economic
benefits of wage increases and of public investment
in care work.67 The findings should be of particular
interest in the current moment, as New York State
enters the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic
and confronts a difficult road to economic and social
recovery. Studies like ours point to a promising
strategy not only for addressing the problems of longterm care but also for spurring broader job growth in
the wake of the economic recession. Previous research
has found that public investment in the care sector
would generate more job growth — for women and
men alike — than would similar investment in the
construction sector.68 Moreover, public funding for

care work is an eminently safe investment, ensuring
both job creation and economic spillover while being
less sensitive to economic fluctuations than industries
like tourism and gaming.
This report’s focus is on specific economic impacts
of improving the compensation of home care workers.
As prior studies have noted, however, raising pay for
direct care workers would also generate important
human impacts, improving the health and well-being
of workers and their families.69 Moreover, because the
home care workforce is comprised primarily of women
of color and immigrants, elevating compensation
would help to mitigate racial and gender inequality
more broadly.70 As advocates and policy-makers
consider the economic dimensions of home care wage
increases, such overarching social benefits should also
be recognized.
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APPENDIX A:

Estimating Public Assistance Savings

T

o estimate program enrollment changes,
we used the ACS and the CPS Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC), obtained
from Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Renae
Rodgers, Steven Ruggles and J. Robert Warren,
IPUMS-CPS: Version 8.0 [dataset] (Minneapolis,
MN: IPUMS, 2020), https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.
V8.0. The ACS 2019 file had sufficient sample sizes
for each geographic zone. We pooled 2015-2020 files
for the CPS ASEC.
We followed Weller et al. (2020) in our approach
to public assistance, as we describe in the body of
the report in reference to estimating changes to
workers’ Medicaid coverage. For Medicaid, we used
ACS data alone, which offered sufficient sample sizes
and variables. From our cost analysis, we estimated
the number of workers losing Medicaid eligibility in
each zone, at each target wage level. We used that
number to calculate Medicaid savings, multiplying
the number of newly ineligible workers by New York
State’s per capita Medicaid spending for adults,
adjusted to 2020 dollars (“Medicaid Per Capita
Expenditures,” Medicaid.gov, 2018, https://www.
medicaid.gov/state-overviews/scorecard/how-muchstates-spend-per-medicaid-enrollee/index.html). Based
on the respondents who would likely lose coverage,
we also estimated the number of children who would
lose Medicaid coverage, and similarly multiplied that
number by New York’s per capita Medicaid spending
for children. Because such children may lose Medicaid
coverage when their parents earn higher wages, the
extension of health insurance plans to those families
is particularly important.
We used a similar strategy for SNAP, EITC, and
School Lunch Program analysis. We first estimated
the current number of home care workers enrolled
in each program, by zone. Then, for each home care
respondent in the ACS file, we assessed whether
or not they would likely remain eligible for each
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program, comparing income eligibility guidelines
with the respondent’s new family income after Target
1 and Target 2 wage increases. For workers currently
earning below the respective target wage levels, we
defined new family income as the target income (plus
spouse’s current total income, if applicable); for home
care workers already earning above the target wage
levels, we defined new family income as the respondent’s current total income (plus spouse’s current
total income, if applicable).
We then took the income eligibility thresholds for
each program, and following Weller et al. (2020:38),
we multiplied the thresholds by 110 percent to create
higher thresholds that “allow for the possibility of
misreported annual income.” By comparing each
respondent’s new, post-raise family income to these
thresholds, we determined the number of respondents
in each zone who would likely lose program eligibility.
However, changes in eligibility are difficult to estimate
based on income alone, because most programs
also allow individuals to qualify through non-income
factors, such as having a child with disabilities or an
adult child enrolled as a full-time student. To account
for such factors, for each program we isolated the
number of home care workers who currently report
recipiency even though their income data suggests
that they are ineligible; we did so using the CPS
or ACS, depending on available program-specific
variables. We assumed that this group of workers
would retain eligibility at Target 1 and Target 2 wage
levels. Further, for some programs, we adjusted for
take-up rates if the number of workers who currently
appeared income-eligible exceeded than the number
who currently reported recipiency. Once we had a final
estimate of the number of workers losing program
eligibility, we multiplied that number by the average
value of each program’s benefits, which we determined using the corresponding CPS variables (with
the exception of Medicaid, as described above).
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APPENDIX B:

Benefits Cliffs
Table B1. Benefits Cliff for Single Worker with Two Children, by Zone,
Before and After Raises, Assuming State Pays for Health Insurance
NYC (5 boroughs)
Before
raise

Gross family
earnings
Earnings after
taxes/credits
Total benefits
Disposable
Income
Change in
disposable
income

After T1
raise

Long Island and Westchester

After T2
raise

Before
raise

After T1
raise

After T2
raise

Rest of State
Before
raise

After T1
raise

After T2
raise

$20,500 $40,000 $50,000 $25,713 $35,000 $45,000 $21,130 $30,000 $40,000
$28,957 $43,191 $42,224 $33,035 $40,183 $47,628 $29,445 $36,373 $43,905
$3,651

$1,217

$45

$3,651

$1,217

$45

$3,651

$3,651

$1,217

$32,608 $44,408 $42,269 $36,686 $41,400 $47,673 $33,096 $40,024 $45,122
36.2%

29.6%

12.8%

29.9%

20.9%

36.3%

Note: In this table, we abbreviate Target Wage 1 as “T1” and Target Wage 2 as “T2.”

Table B2. Benefits Cliff for Single Worker with Two Children, by Zone, Before and After Raises,
Assuming Workers Must Purchase Their Own Health Insurance
NYC (5 boroughs)
Before
raise

After T1
raise

After T2
raise

Long Island and Westchester
Before
raise

After T1
raise

After T2
raise

Rest of State
Before
raise

After T1
raise

After T2
raise

Disposable
$32,608 $44,408 $42,269 $36,686 $41,400 $47,673 $33,096 $40,024 $45,122
Income
Cost to purchase
n/a
$5,465
$5,609
n/a
$5,153
$5,153
n/a
$4,178
$4,394
health care
Disposable
income after raise
$32,608 $38,943 $36,660 $36,686 $36,247 $42,520 $33,096 $35,846 $40,728
and purchase of
health care
Change in
19.4%
12.4%
-1.2%
15.9%
8.3%
23.1%
disposable
income
Note: In this table, we abbreviate Target Wage 1 as “T1” and Target Wage 2 as “T2.”
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APPENDIX C:

Cost of Raises in Context

T

able C1 shows the projected costs of increased
home care worker compensation as a
percentage of four figures:

• New York State’s Gross Domestic Product, which
was $1.751 trillion in 2020;
• The State’s operating funds, which are $103.4
billion for 2022;

• Total healthcare expenditures in New York State,
estimated at $311.2 billion for 2022 (including
spending on all health care services and administrative costs);
• Total long-term care expenditures in New York
State, estimated at $38 billion in 2022.71

Table C1. Cost of Wage Increases and Health Coverage in Relation to New York State GDP,
Operating Budget, and Healthcare Expenditures
Cost

Wage increase to
Target 1
Wage increase to
Target 1 plus health
coverage
Wage increase to
Target 2
Wage increase to
Target 2 plus health
coverage
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Percentage of
State GDP (2020)

Percentage of
State Operating Funds
(2022)

Percent of Total NYS
Healthcare Spending
(2022)

Percent of Total NYS
Long-Term Care
Spending (2022)

0.18%

3.0%

1.0%

8.2%

0.23%

3.8%

1.3%

10.4%

0.31%

5.1%

1.7%

13.9%

0.37%

6.0%

2.0%

16.5%
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1 Authors’ analysis of “County Projections Explorer,” Cornell
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cornell.edu/counties/projections.cfm.
2 Authors’ analysis of “Long-Term Occupational Employment
Projections, 2018-2028,” New York State Department of Labor,
accessed January 2021, https://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/lsproj.shtm.
Projections are only available for home health aides and personal
care aides overall, so these estimates include those working in
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aides” and “personal care aides” are occupational titles used in
U.S. government statistics. As defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, home health aides differ from personal care aides in
that the former are typically supervised by licensed nursing staff
and may provide assistance with simple healthcare tasks such as
changing bandages, dressing wounds, and administering medication. Both occupations, however, may involve providing assistance
with activities of daily living (such as feeding, bathing, toileting,
and ambulation) and with instrumental activities of daily living
(such as preparing meals, light housekeeping, and doing laundry).
Because of their similar and overlapping duties, in practice the
two occupations are often hard to distinguish. Furthermore, in
New York State, personal care aides employed through Medicaid
Consumer Directed Personal Assistance may also perform basic
health-related tasks (see Carol Rodat, “New York’s Home Care
Aide Workforce,” PHI, 2010, https://phinational.org/wp-content/
uploads/legacy/clearinghouse/PHI-486%20NY%20Framing.pdf).
On the other hand, in New York State, certified home health aides
are required to receive 75 hours of training as well as 12 hours of
continuing education annually. This report focuses on home health
aides and personal care aides who work in private homes, as
opposed to in nursing homes or other group care facilities.
3 For detailed national and state projections, see Stephen
Campbell, “New Research: 7.8 Million Direct Care Jobs Will Need
to Be Filled by 2026,” PHI, January 24, 2019, https://phinational.
org/news/new-research-7-8-million-direct-care-jobs-will-need-to-befilled-by-2026/.
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uploads/2019/02/HCA-Financial-Condition-Report-2019.pdf.
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Healthcare Labor Market Gaps and Opportunities by State,”
accessed January 2021, https://www.mercer.us/our-thinking/
career/us-healthcare-labor-market-interactive-map.html#exploremap. Mercer projects that, in 2024, the supply of home health
aides in New York State will fall short of demand by 23,000
workers. It is likely that the current annual shortage is already
near that number, and that it may grow further due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. For more detail on Mercer’s projections,

see also Matthew Stevenson, “Demand for Healthcare Workers
Will Outpace Supply by 2025: An Analysis of The US Healthcare
Labor Market,” Mercer Health Provider Advisory, 2018, https://
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analysis of the home care labor shortage and its implications, see
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Long-Term Workforce (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2017).
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Shortage in the Hudson Valley,” Hand-in-Hand: The Domestic
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wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Hudson-Valley-Home-CareShortage-Report-10pt-1.pdf.
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from September 2020 HCA Member Survey of Status,” document
provided to authors, December 2020.
9 Due to rounding, these figures do not correspond precisely with
the cost and benefit figures cited earlier in this paragraph.
10 Christian Weller, Beth Almeida, Marc Cohen, and Robyn Stone,
“Making Care Work Pay: How Paying at Least a Living Wage Would
Benefit Care Recipients, Workers, and Communities,” LeadingAge
and LTSS Center at UMass Boston, 2020, https://leadingage.org/
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Women’s Budget Group, 2020, https://wbg.org.uk/analysis/
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13 For details on Medicaid payment rates, minimum wage
increases, and the financial state of New York’s home care
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agencies, see Home Care Association of New York, “Testimony to
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on the 2019-20 Executive Budget,” February 5, 2019, https://www.
nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimony_given_by_the_home_
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Homecare and Early Care and Education Workers in the New
Generation of Minimum Wage Laws,” UC Berkeley Center for
Labor Research and Education, 2018, https://laborcenter.berkeley.
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16 That right was established by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, issued in its
1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C. For details on the developing
Michigan case, Waskul v. Washtenaw County Community Mental
Health, see United States Court of Appeals, Case 19-1400,
Document 65-1, October 29, 2020, https://nclej.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/11/waskul-6th-circuit-opinion.pdf.
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24 To estimate how many workers would likely lose eligibility
for Medicaid and other public assistance, we followed Weller et
al. (2020). We determined current Medicaid coverage based on
whether a worker reports having such coverage in the ACS. Then,
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We also examined the costs for a Silver Plan, which would raise
health care costs and reduce the increase in disposable income.
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